Users have long faced serious problems with the Post Office’s Horizon system, but it’s important to remember that its predecessor, Capture, created significant issues, causing real hardship for many.
In February 1992, before Capture even launched, the Post Office was aware that simply turning off the system could corrupt data. But they didn’t take action to fix this. They also failed to implement an audit trail, meaning no one could trace who did what in the system. During the ‘90s, people began to view computers as undeniably reliable. Capture seemed like a step forward since it reduced errors, but it didn’t eliminate them.
In June 1994, newsletters praised Capture, claiming that offices using it made 55% fewer cash account errors. They promised it would save time, hassle, and money. But what about the remaining errors? The Post Office knew that power failures could wreak havoc, and there were known issues with the software. For instance, they warned that any pre-upgrade information inputted would be overwritten and needed to be re-entered.
All of this relied on busy subpostmasters being fully informed while they juggled long hours, often managing other businesses. Yet, despite these glaring issues, local managers, auditors, and even judges ignored the mounting evidence as prosecutions continued. The notion that subpostmasters were stealing from their own businesses was absurd. In reality, many were using their own money to balance the books.
Bravery awards and accolades for “Post Office of the Year” couldn’t protect those suffering from these injustices. As I write, around a hundred cases are still under investigation, and real exoneration and reparations seem like distant goals. The misery continues.
When I joined the Post Office in 1974, getting ahead often came from connections in the Freemasons or the Territorial Army—both exclusive. The workplace had a military vibe. They favored uniforms and former soldiers as postmen.
The atmosphere was stifling. The Official Secrets Act meant you kept your head down. If something shady happened, silence was the rule. One director even forged backdated memos to cover up issues, and nothing came of it. They managed to conceal losses amounting to hundreds of millions from failed ventures like the Thames Valley Pilot. While these failed projects appeared in reports, they flew under the radar.
Thinking back to my time at the Post Office in the ‘80s and ‘90s, I remember an environment thick with fear and suspicion. I worked in credit control in Birmingham from 1983 to 1986. Following a significant debt incident where a customer defaulted on £250,000, I worried for my job while chasing debts. I visited local post offices unannounced, and during one such visit, a branch manager was visibly shaken when she saw me. She thought I was there to fire her, but my visit was just a social call. That astonishment showed how isolated she felt.
As the ‘90s progressed, the Post Office began closing directly-managed branches and outsourcing to sub-offices and franchises. This meant less direct control over business operations, diluting essential knowledge. Few managers in London had real experience in running a post office.
Agents were handling large sums of money with minimal oversight. A hands-off approach left sub-offices to enjoy only sporadic visits from local managers and auditors, often only when trouble arose. Over time, as new oversight roles were introduced, the gulf between local managers and operational control only widened. They bore responsibility but lacked real authority or adequate training in technology.
